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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a final judgment and a 
final order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County (the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki). Fairview Care Cen-
ters, Inc., the defendant-appellant, appealed to this Court, 
which transferred the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, which 
had original jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-
2(j). The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, "poured" this appeal "over" to 
this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Fairview failed to marshal the evidence 
in support of the District Court's factual findings and, if so, 
whether Fairview is prohibited from attacking the validity of 
the District Court's Findings of Fact. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The Court should review Fairview1s Brief, determine 
whether Fairview has failed to marshal the evidence in support 
of the District Court's Findings of Fact, and, if it so deter-
mines, rule that Fairview is prohibited from attacking those 
Findings. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether the District Court's Findings of Fact 
1 
were not clearly erroneous. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
If this Court determines to review the District Court 
findings of factf despite Fairviewfs failure to marshal the 
evidence, those findings should not be set aside unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). A finding is 
considered clearly erroneous only if it is against the clear 
weight of the evidence presented or if the appellate court is 
convinced that a mistake has been made. Western Kane County 
Special Serv. Dist, No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 
1377 (Utah 1987). 
3. Whether the District Court correctly ruled that 
Fairview's termination of Ms. Rackleyfs employment implicated a 
clear and substantial public policy. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with 
respect to this issue appears to be de novo (as purely a 
question of law). "[A]ppellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 
Correctness.'" State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); 
"correctness" means "the appellate court decides the matter for 
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of the law." IJL_; State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 
2 
433 (Utah 1993). 
4. Whether the District Court correctly ruled that 
Ms. Rackleyfs conduct in advancing Muriel Mellen!s rights 
constituted conduct furthering clear and substantial public 
policy. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with 
respect to this issue appears to be de novo (as purely a 
question of law). "[A]ppellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 
'correctness.'" State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
5. Whether Fairview is judicially estopped from 
taking positions on appeal that are directly contrary to those 
taken during the District Court proceedings. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Since the District Court was not presented with this 
issue, this Court should simply review Fairview1s positions 
taken during the trial proceedings and the positions taken on 
appeal and determine, as a matter of law, whether Fairview is 
estopped from taking a contrary position on appeal. 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for unlawful termination of employ-
ment, in violation of the public policy of the State of Utah, 
visited upon plaintiff-appellee, Cathleen Rackley, by 
defendant-appellant, Fairview Care Centers, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Fairview"). Ms. Rackley was fired from her job as the Admin-
istrator of one of the two Salt Lake City nursing homes owned 
and operated by Fairview because of her insistence that 
Fairview abide by legal and equitable principles dealing with 
the rights of the infirm and elderly residents of Fairviewfs 
west side facility, as well as the rights of her co-employees. 
Ms. Rackley was fired because she informed a Fairview resident, 
against Fairview1s wishes, that money belonging to that resi-
dent had arrived at Fairview, and because she took action 
geared toward allowing that resident to exercise control over 
that residentfs own money. That resident was under no conser-
vatorship or guardianship. 
This case was tried before Judge Iwasaki on October 
29, 30 and November 1, 8, and 15, 1996. R. at 342-48. The 
District Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in Plaintiff's favor on December 27, 1996. R. at 354-60 (a 
4 
copy is attached hereto at pages 1-7 of the Addendum). 
B. OVERVIEW OF FACTS 
Ms. Rackley worked as the administrator/manager of 
one of Fairview's nursing homes for four months (November 1, 
1993 to February 28, 1994). Tr. Vol. 2 at 402, 587-89.1 Ms. 
Rackley had worked in other nursing home facilities and had 
experience with clients of varying levels of mental function-
ing. Ms. Rackley testified that she understood the importance 
of always notifying residents when they received money, regard-
less of their level of functioning. Tr. Vol. 2 at 396-97. 
Throughout her employment as administrator of 
Fairview's west side facility, Ms. Rackley established herself 
as a conscientious employee who instituted many positive 
changes in the facility. Tr. Vol. 1 at 124; Vol. 3 at 757-59. 
Ms. Rackley was described by Sallie Maroney, the administrator 
for Fairview's east side facility as "exceptionally bright and 
energetic and very, very knowledgeable." Tr. Vol. 1 at 212. 
On a number of occasions during her employment, Ms. 
Rackley took actions that were geared toward honoring and 
upholding the law and refraining from violating the require-
1
 The transcripts of the trial were not "Bates-stamped" 
by the District Court for the appeal. When citing to these 
transcripts, the volume number and page number of the tran-
script will be identified. 
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ments of her licensure as a nursing home administrator and 
toward protecting the legal rights of Fairviewfs employees (Tr. 
Vol. 3 at 740) and the residents of Fairview!s nursing home 
facility. Tr. Vol. 2 at 540. Ms. Rackley implemented changes 
with regard to paying employees according to the law -- meaning 
that, if pay day fell on a weekend or holiday, employees would 
be paid the first prior working day. Tr. Vol. 1 at 214-17. 
This procedure had not been followed at Fairview because of 
supposed "cash flow" problems. Tr. Vol. 1 at 218-19. 
Ms. Rackley also implemented changes in informing 
employees that they were entitled to Hepatitis B vaccinations 
at Fairview!s expense. This was in accordance with the law. 
Tr. Vol. 1 at 220-21. Fairview had not told employees about 
the vaccinations because the company was in "financial scraps." 
Tr. Vol. 1 at 42-43, 220-21. 
Another employee, Sallie Maroney (administrator of 
east side facility), testified that she was under a lot of 
pressure when Ms. Rackley began working at Fairview and that 
Ms. Rackley suggested schedule changes that were implemented 
and had a positive impact on Ms. Maroneyfs job satisfaction. 
Tr. Vol. 1 at 212. Ms. Rackley also implemented changes in 
food service to residents (Tr. Vol. 2 at 481-82), in laundry 
service (Tr. Vol. 2 at 480-81) and schedule changes for other 
6 
employees (Tr. Vol. 2 at 485). Other employees described 
improvements in efficiency, cleanliness and the overall opera-
tion of the Fairview west facility. Tr. Vol. 1 at 38-41. 
Fairviewfs management was not enthusiastic about the 
actions taken by Ms. Rackley to uphold the law and honor the 
rights of residents and employees. Tr. Vol. 3 at 628. Ms. 
Rackley met with resistance on a number of occasions. Tr. Vol. 
2 at 450, 453, 459, 463, 482, 485. Ms. Rackley testified that 
she had began to feel intimidated by Joseph Petersen, the 
Fairview boss. Tr. Vol. 2 at 522. 
All witnesses who were questioned on the subject 
agreed that a resident has an absolute right to control her own 
money. Karleen Merkley, office manager and assistant C.E.O. of 
Fairview had responsibility for financial decisions within 
Fairview during the time Ms. Rackley was employed. Ms. Merkley 
testified at trial: 
Q. (Counsel for Ms. Rackley) . . . When you say you make 
the financial decisions when Mr. Pete [Mr. Petersen] 
isn't around, does that refer to financial decisions 
involving residents1 money as well as other things? 
A. (Ms. Merkley) I don't make any decisions with resi 
dents1 money. 
Q. Okay. Who makes those decisions? 
A. The residents. 
Q. That's the way it's supposed to be, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's the way it's always supposed to be there— 
A. Yes. 
Q. •—is that right? Are you aware of any situations 
where that has not been the case? 
A. No. 
Q. As far as you know, every time a decision's made 
about residentfs money, the resident has made that 
decision herself or himself; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Tr. Vol. 1 at 86. 
Despite these statements by Ms. Merkley, Ms. Rackley 
had been told by other Fairview employees not to get involved 
with residents1 finances. Sallie Maroney testified that she 
had never told Ms. Rackley "not to concern herself about what 
was going on with residents' personal monies." Tr. Vol. 1 at 
221. However, when counsel for Ms. Rackley confronted Ms. 
Maroney with her deposition testimony and then elicited Ms. 
Maroney's opinion regarding an administrator's responsibility 
to her or his residents: 
(Ms. Rackleyfs counsel reading from Ms. Maroney's 
deposition) 
"QUESTION: Did you ever tell Cathleen not to worry 
about what was going on with residents' personal 
monies? 
ANSWER: Yes. Probably." 
(Ms. Rackley's counsel) Did I read that correctly? 
A. (Sallie Maroney) Yes. 
Q. Cathleen was the administrator, licensed administra-
tor of the facility; correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. You, too, were a licensed administrator for a number 
of years; correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. Isn't it the administrator—within the administra-
tor's licensure and—and—and other responsibility to 
concern herselves [sic] with things having to do with 
residents' rights? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And—and doesn't knowledge about funds have something 
to do with residents1 rights, ma'am? Yes or no. 
A. Yes. 
Tr. Vol. 1 at 221-22 (emphasis added). Staff at Fairview 
understood that residents should make decisions about their own 
money, but in practice, these rights were disregarded. 
In the latter part of February, 1994, Ms. Rackley 
became aware of funds that had arrived for a resident, Muriel 
Mellen. Tr. Vol. 3 at 570-71. A $720.00 check had arrived 
from the Veterans Administration. Fairview acknowledges in its 
Brief that management at Fairview had instructed the staff not 
to notify Muriel Mellen of the check. (Aplt. Brief at 4). In 
fact, the entire staff at Fairview conspired to keep from 
Muriel Mellen the fact that her $720.00 check had arrived at 
the facility. The reason became apparent during the direct 
examination of Sallie Maroney: 
Q. (Counsel for Ms. Rackley) And did--did Karleen 
Merkley tell you that Sharon Mellen doesn't want 
Muriel Mellen to know that the money had arrived? 
A. (Sallie Maroney) Yes. 
Q. And was the reason for that that $720 was enough to 
move out of the Fairview facility? 
A. And live on her own. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Sharon's request not to tell Muriel about the 
money seemed reasonable to you. Yes or no. 
A. Yes. 
Tr. Vol. 1 at 230 (emphasis added). 
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Sharon Mellen (Muriel Mellenfs daughter-in-law), with 
the complicity of Fairviewfs administration, was keeping the 
payment from coming to the attention of Muriel Mellen. Tr. 
Vol. 3 at 576. 
Ms. Rackley was aware that Fairviewfs administration 
and staff were purposefully keeping this information from 
Muriel, so she told Muriel about the check. Tr. Vol. 3 at 
576.2 Muriel was extremely upset. Tr. Vol. 3 at 575. At 
Muriel's request, Ms. Rackley contacted Sharon Mellen. Tr. 
Vol. 3 at 574-75. 
Ms. Rackley testified that she simply told Sharon 
Mellen that she was concerned about Muriel and that she did not 
accuse Sharon Mellen of improper conduct and did not raise her 
voice. Sharon Mellen was very angry that Muriel had been told 
about the money because "she was promised that nobody would 
find out about the money, that Karleen had talked to her and 
nobody should find out about it." Tr. Vol. 3 at 57 6. 
Fairview repeatedly states that Sharon Mellen had 
legal authorization to "handle Muriel's money." Aplt. Brief at 
4. The document Muriel Mellen signed stated: "TO WHOM IT MAY 
CONCERN, I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT SHARON MELLEN [words FAIRVIEW 
2
 Ms. Rackley had, as previously discussed, brought a 
number of problems at the facility to management's attention, 
and had encountered resistance to change at almost every turn. 
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CARE CENTER crossed out] HAS AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST ME IN 
MANAGING MY PERSONAL NEEDS ALLOWANCE FUNDS." Def. Ex. 12 (a 
true and correct copy attached hereto at page 21 of the Adden-
dum) . This form is not a power of attorney. The language 
allows for Sharon Mellen to "assist" Muriel Mellen in handling 
certain funds. The term "assist" means to "aid" or "help," not 
to take complete responsibility for and not to keep the resi-
dent in the dark. The plain language of the document allows 
for Sharon Mellen to help, at Muriel Mellen!s direction, Muriel 
Mellen manage Muriel Mellen1s funds. If Muriel Mellen is not 
informed that she has received funds, she is unable to direct 
Sharon Mellen as to how those funds should be used. It is a 
curious interpretation indeed that Fairview advances - that 
Muriel's signing of the management assistance document is 
tantamount to empowering Sharon, and Fairview, to keep her in 
the dark about the existence of the funds.3 
At a meeting held on February 28, 1994, Mr. Petersen, 
acting for Fairview, fired Ms. Rackley. Tr. Vol. 3 at 592. 
During the meeting, and after she had been fired, Ms. Rackley 
informed Mr. Petersen, in essence, that Fairview would have 
3
 Fairview notes that Sharon Mellen was authorized to 
sign on Muriel Mellen's bank account. Aplt. Brief at 4 n.2. 
This fact has no bearing on Muriel Mellenfs right to know about 
money she received. 
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problems down the road because of the firing. Tr. Vol. 3 at 
593. Fairview then, through Mr. Petersen, offered to rehire 
Ms. Rackley, on the condition that she discuss resident fi-
nances with Fairviewfs Ms. Merkley or Ms. Maroney before 
talking with resident families about such matters. Tr. Vol. 3 
at 597-98. Ms. Rackley rejected the offer because she knew 
that that would, based on the Muriel Mellen incident, jeopar-
dize residents1 rights, and that she would not be able to 
uphold the legal obligations placed on her or be able to 
execute her job duties, especially in the area of resident 
rights. Tr. Vol. 3 at 597-99. 
Other employees at Fairview testified that they had 
contacted resident family members by phone before and had never 
been reprimanded or warned not to do so. Tr. Vol. 1 at 56. 
After Ms. Rackley was terminated, she notified Ana 
Lird, of the Salt Lake County Aging Services, of the events 
surrounding the Muriel Mellen incident. Ms. Lird sent two 
letters, one dated June 16, 1994, and one dated December 5, 
1994 to the Fairview west facility regarding the Mellen inci-
dent. PI. Ex. No. 14 & 15 (copies attached as Exhibit "B" of 
Addendum to Aplt. Brief). Both letters were accompanied by a 
document entitled "Long Term Care Ombudsman Finding and Recom-
mendation." The first one concluded that Ms. Rackley!s com-
12 
plaint of Fairview's misconduct had been "verified," and the 
second one concluded that the complaint had been "semi-veri-
fied." Id. Both reports also include the language that "any 
discriminatory action or retaliation taken against any person 
who provided information regarding the complaint constitutes a 
Class B misdemeanor." 
The District Court found that Ms. Rackley was termi-
nated by Fairview and that her termination was in violation of 
clear and substantial public policy.4 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1« Fairview!s Brief fails in a number of respects. 
First, Fairview has failed to marshal the evidence in support 
of the District Court's Findings of Fact. Second, Fairview has 
failed to identify anywhere in the record in which it preserved 
the issues it now raises on appeal. Third, Fairview has failed 
to attach the District Court's Findings of Fact and a tran-
script of the District Court's Oral Decision. These deficien-
4
 Fairview erroneously states that the District Court 
found that the phone call that Ms. Rackley had made to Sharon 
Mellen "was the only factor which predicated Ms. Rackley's 
termination." Aplt. Brief at 9. This statement is not found 
anywhere in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered 
by the Court. See R. at 354-360; Addendum at 1-7. Instead, 
the District Court ultimately found that "Defendant's violation 
of that [right of residents to know about personal monies] 
public policy was a substantial factor (and, according to the 
evidence, the only factor) in defendant's termination of 
plaintiff's employment." R. at 356; Addendum at 3. 
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cies prohibit Fairview from prevailing in this appeal. 
2. At trial, Fairview failed to present evidence 
that Ms. Rackley was terminated for any reason other than that 
her conduct was in furtherance of public policy. Without such 
evidence, Fairview cannot establish that Ms. Rackley was fired 
for any other reason than that she took steps geared toward 
furthering the important public policy of residents being 
informed that funds belonging to them had arrived at the 
facility. 
3. The District Court correctly ruled that Fairview 
terminated Ms. Rackley because she engaged in conduct (notify-
ing a resident that money had arrived for her) that implicated 
clear and substantial public policy. This public policy is 
evidenced in the Utah Constitution and in federal and state 
statutes and regulations. This Court can affirm the District 
Court's ruling that clear and substantial public policy was 
implicated in this case by finding the existence of such a 
public policy in one or more of the provisions cited by Ms. 
Rackley at trial. 
4. Under relevant Utah case law, Ms. Rackley!s 
conduct in notifying a resident that funds had arrived was 
conduct furthering the substantial public policy of notifying a 
resident that her funds had arrived. 
5. Fairview takes a number of positions on appeal 
14 
that are contrary to those asserted by Fairview at trial. At 
trial, Fairview acknowledged that for a termination to impli-
cate public policy, it was not necessary that a violation of 
the law occur. On appeal, Fairview suggests that a violation 
of law is essential. Fairview also argued at trial that Utah 
case law required that employees pursue violations of public 
policy internally. On appeal, Fairview argues that employees 
must report violations to "authorities." Fairview should be 
judicially estopped from taking contrary positions on appeal 
when its arguments failed at trial. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. DEFICIENCIES IN FAIRVIEW1S BRIEF PROHIBIT FAIRVIEW 
FROM PREVAILING IN THIS APPEAL. 
1. Fairview has Failed to Marshal the Evidence in 
Support of the District Court's Findings of 
Fact. 
Fairview's appeal implicitly challenges a number of 
the District Court's findings of fact. It is a well estab-
lished principle of appellate law that "it is an appellant's 
burden to marshal all the evidence that supports the court's 
finding and then demonstrate why, even viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the court below, it is insufficient to 
support the finding made." General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. 
Co.. 766 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah App. 1988). If the appellant 
fails to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
15 
factual findings, the appellate court will only review the 
trial court!s legal conclusions, but will consider its findings 
of fact supported. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 
1991) . 
Fairview has abysmally failed to marshal the evidence 
in support of the District Court's findings of fact. This 
Court should, accordingly, not even consider disturbing the 
District Court's factual findings in this case. 
2. Fairview has Failed to Identify the Preservation 
of the Issues Raised on Appeal. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that when the issues for review are outlined, there 
shall be "citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (5) (A). 
Fairview has failed to cite where the issues presented were 
supposedly preserved in the District Court proceedings. 
3. Fairview has Failed to Attach the Findings of 
Fact and a Transcript of the District Court's 
Oral Decision. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also 
provides that the brief of the appellant shall contain "those 
parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to 
the determination of the appeal, such as . . . findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of 
the court's oral decision . . .." Utah R. App. P. 
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24(a)(11)(C). 
Ms. Rackley includes, in this Brief, the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (Addendum at pages 1-7) and the 
transcript of the oral decision. (Addendum at pages 8-20). 
B. FAIRVIEW FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE IN THE DIS-
TRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS THAT MS. RACKLEY WAS TERMI-
NATED FOR ANY REASON OTHER THAN THAT HER CONDUCT WAS 
IN FURTHERANCE OF PUBLIC POLICY. 
When Judge Iwasaki made his oral ruling at the end of 
this case, he made a number of important observations. First, 
he found that Ms. Rackley had been fired. Tr. Vol. 5 at 1233. 
Second, under Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 837 (Utah 
1992), he proceeded to analyze the three-prong test. First, 
did the "termination implicate a clear and substantial public 
policy? Yes it did." Tr. Vol. 5 at 1233.5 Judge Iwasaki then 
moved on to the third factor: "[v]iolation of the public policy 
must be a substantial factor in the plaintiff's termination." 
Tr. Vol. 5 at 1234. The Judge found that: 
The defense, on the other hand, took and maintained 
the sole defense in that she wasn't fired, she quit, 
and did not present any nexus to this Court, from the 
person who has the obligation of hiring and firing, 
Mr. Petersen, as to whether or not, if he didnft--if 
she didnft quit, what factors were present that would 
substantiate a firing. 
The defendants [sic] chose to put all their eggs in 
5
 The public policy at issue, the rights of residents in 
nursing homes, is discussed at pages 20-31 infra. 
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one basket. The defendants chose to say this—this 
person quit and there is no—nothing to weigh. Once 
that fails, there's nothing before the Court. 
Tr. Vol. 5 at 1235. 
The only conceivable significance of the evidence 
regarding Ms. Rackley's supposed tardiness or absenteeism on 
the job was its supposedly being a cause for termination. Tr. 
Vol. 1 at 278-79. Fairview elicited testimony regarding such 
things, but never asserted in any fashion that they were a 
basis for termination. Fairview, having taken the position 
that Ms. Rackley was not fired, cannot now hope to convince 
this Court that she was fired for any reason other than that 
found by Judge Iwasaki — her taking steps geared toward 
furthering the important public policy of residents being 
informed that funds belonging to them had arrived at the 
facility. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT FAIRVIEW 
TERMINATED THE EMPLOYMENT OF MS. RACKLEY IN VIOLATION 
OF THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Utah law allows an employee fired in violation of 
public policy to recover tort damages. Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 959 (Utah 1992); see also Peter-
son v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1281-85 (Utah 1992); Heslop v. 
Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 837 (Utah 1992). The public policy 
exception to the employment at-will doctrine has been recog-
nized because "an action for wrongful discharge is an appropri-
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ate way to protect both the public interest and the employee 
from an employer's oppressive use of power." Hodges v. Gibson 
Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 166 (Utah 1991). 
The Utah cases analyzing this issue provide guidance 
in analyzing whether an employee is discharged "in a manner or 
for a reason that contravened a 'clear and substantial public 
policy' of the State of Utah, a public policy rooted in Utah's 
constitution or statutes." Retherford, 844 at 966. "Clear and 
substantial public policy" is a policy that is of "overarching 
importance to the public as opposed to the parties only," and 
whether the policy is so significant that we should place it 
"beyond the reach of contract." Id. at n.9. The Utah Supreme 
Court has also acknowledged that termination in violation of 
public policy can arise where federal or other state laws are 
involved. Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1283. 
The District Court identified, in its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. at 354-60; Addendum at 1-7), 
seven constitutional, statutory, and regulatory indices of 
public policy that are implicated in Fairview's termination of 
Ms. Rackley's employment: 
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 27 of the Utah Constitution 
42 U.S.C. §§ 3058g(a)(3) and (5) 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-3-201, et seq. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396(i) (6) 
Utah Admin. Code § R432-150-4 
19 
42 C.F.R. § 483.10 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law p. 6, 1 1 (R. at 359; 
Addendum at page 6). This Court can affirm the District 
Court's legal conclusions in this case by finding substantial 
public policy evidenced in one or more of these constitutional, 
statutory, and/or regulatory provisions, or, for that matter, 
any other satisfactory clear and substantial index of public 
policy. 
Article I, Section 1, of the Utah Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "[a]11 [persons] have 
the inherent and inalienable right to . . . acquire, possess 
and protect property . . .." (emphasis added). Article I, 
Section 27, of the Utah Constitution provides, "[f]requent 
recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the 
security of individual rights . . .." (emphasis added). These 
provisions establish core fundamental values in this State -
most relevant to this case, the right of an individual (such as 
Muriel Mellen) to exercise dominion over property. It goes 
without saying — "knowledge is power" - that a person, espe-
cially one such as Muriel Mellen (not under guardianship or 
conservatorship), must know that she has property before she 
has a chance to exercise dominion over it. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-3-301, et seq., evidence Utah's 
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independent ba^is, -r ^  -^  resides in a -..ng-'terr' car- faci- -
i-y " n ^ h Code Ann . ..... 
From the record :!f appears thai. Murie] Mellen was 
over sixty years and wa. :*-.- .-; 
unable t' live without assistance r, . ,. :* : hb n:\z :;:. 
b a t ; . - • . - • , ; - . •- ": ' -- --'in 
Carp Ombudsman Program wou.d apply to residents nke ib;r;e. 
M e I J.- • . 
The Utah Legislature has explicitly set forth the 
, ., , •- a -tment. Utah Code Ann, § 
62A-3-2C- is entir.iea "Legislative r.. ndings - Purpose - Ombuds-
man ;-,--• ~ • • provides : 
The Legislature finds and declares mar u:ie 
aging citizens of this state should be assisted in 
asserting their civil and human rights as patients, 
residents and clients of long-rerm care facilities 
created to serve their specialized needs and prob-
lems; and for the health, safety and welfare of these 
citizens, the state should take appropriate action 
through an adequate legal framework ^n address their 
difficulties, 
Fairview contends (Aplt. Brief at 21) that none of 
the provisions cited by Ms. Rackley articulates an underlying 
public policy. Fairview also suggests that none of the subject 
indices of public policy specifically contemplates Ms. 
Rackleyfs conduct with regard to Muriel Mullen's money. If 
this Court were to adopt this analytical framework, it would 
essentially be ignoring the policy underlying the developing 
line of Utah cases in this area. Accepting Fairview's argument 
would be tantamount to decreeing that all the specifics of a 
given factual scenario would have to be specifically antici-
pated by constitutional provision, statute, or regulation, in 
order that a claim for wrongful termination for violation of 
public policy could proceed. Ms. Rackley respectfully suggests 
that the law does not work that way. 
The Utah Legislature has enunciated Utah's public 
policy underlying the Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program in terms 
satisfactorily explicit with regard to the instant dispute. 
The term "civil and human rights" certainly contemplates a 
person's right to control her own money. 
Also pertinent are 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c) (6) and 
1396r (c)(6), which set forth requirements regarding the protec-
tion of funds of residents of nursing homes. Ms. Rackley 
acknowledges that Muriel Mellen did not authorize Fairview to 
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control over, ana -.t*^  z-, r.er ow ^~e T T. 
-i ^n ^c. - :.is , r ? it v?e Code sectior. h-i. 4 ^  , Protection 
f^ Residents Funds states: 
A. A resident has che right to maintai 
financial attairs -x- :: " ne facility may not require a 
resident to deposit n:s persona", funoc- *;:-: the 
facility. 
B. Management oi persona, f^ r.u_-. ":•.:. Aiitte* 
authorization by a resident, the facility must held, 
safeguard, r.anage and account, for the resident's 
persona"1 -•:• deposited vi"v '--.& f^^ility in accor-
dance with R432-150-4.400C. 
(Emphasis added).6 
The provisions of law referenced in the District 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law support the 
clear and substantial public policy that persons (including 
elderly nursing home residents) have the right to control their 
property. 
Evidence that steps taken by Ms. Rackley, in further-
ance of Muriel Mellen's obtaining awareness that money belong-
ing to her had arrived at the Fairview facility, implicated a 
clear and substantial public policy can be found in the testi-
mony of Fairview1s own high-level employees. 
Joseph Petersen, the general manager and vice presi-
dent of the corporation that owns Fairview acknowledged at 
trial that "residents are absolutely entitled to get their 
money themselves." Tr. Vol. 3 at 754 (emphasis added). 
When cross-examined by Ms. Rackley1s counsel, Mr. 
Petersen himself acknowledged, without objection by Fairview1s 
counsel, that terminating an employee for protecting a resi-
6
 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(c) provides an almost identical 
provision: "[p]rotection of resident funds. (1) The resident 
has the right to manage his or her financial affairs, and the 
facility may not require residents to deposit their personal 
funds with the facility." 
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(Counsel for Ms. Rackley) Would you agree with me, 
for the sake of discussion, that if your company, 
through you or anyone else in management, fired 
Cathleen Rackley because she wn- trying tc "!-' Muriel 
Mellen know that Muriel Mel1 en had money there, wr^n 
nobody else in administration would tell Muriel 
Mellen that, would you agree that that was wrong, 
fire her for that? 
(Mr. Petersen) To fire her--:. 
somebody? 
Yes. 
Absolutely not, i t wouldn't be wrong. 
It wou1dnf t be wrong to fire her for that? 
No. I mean, it wouldn't be right for a facility to 
fire anybody for—it1 s 
against the law, i 3—i*' jainst wha4- we ^ ^a^^ 
for. 
And if, for the sa.rx .,1 uiscuss:.:,::, ^ : ,.
 J our company 
decided to fire Muriel — or Cathleen Rackley, ;:. 
broader sense, because she was someone who was per-
ceived by your company to be someone who was devoted 
to protecting the rights of these people legally and 
as a matter of dignity, including their funds, wc-.ld 
you think; that was wrong? 
I do not believe that was .^  ..ao,-. 
If she were fired for thai:, would you agree with * -e 
that that would be wronq, a very bad thing for y;"- *r 
company to have done"" 
It would not only '— "•• - l, 
3 at: 7 64-65 (emphasis added) . 
1
 . . • • •: .,* iriaroney, a 
rig-time managerial employee of E air view: 
v^wv^^. *- + .... . r.acK.ie>; Let1- ^ay *:zi the sa:<e cf 
discussion that Sharon Mellen, t ased or. everythi: • 
that yc : learned while you were rhere |_at Fairv:' " -
had not oeen given the authority to have any pov 
over Muriel's money; are you witn me so far? 
(Sallie Maroney Yes. 
Let's say sh'-'d not been gi ven any written autncr^^y 
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to do that, and then she did it anyway; do you see 
anything wrong with that? 
A. Yes. 
Tr. Vol. 1 at 226 (emphasis added). 
Even Sharon Mellen acknowledged the importance of 
notifying residents when their checks arrive and that Muriel 
Mellen had a right to be notified that her funds had arrived: 
Q. (Counsel for Ms. Rackley) Ma1am, you don't dispute 
the idea that your mother-in-law, as a patient of 
Fairview or a resident, had the right to know when 
her money got there, do you? 
A. (Sharon Mellen) No. 
Q. You think it's—you—you agree that it's important 
for people in her situation to know when— 
A. Yes. 
Q. —they get money? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And am I correct in my understanding, I know there's 
been other testimony in this case, but was it your 
understanding that Karleen Merkley or whoever at 
Fairview West you were communicating with regularly, 
had something set up so that you would be informed 
about Muriel's money and she wouldn't be? 
A. No. 
Q. That was not your intention? 
A. Well-
Q. Yes or no. 
COUNSEL FOR FAIRVIEW: If you can't answer it yes or 
no— 
A. (Sharon Mellen) I don't remember what—I remember 
talking to Karleen, waiting for the check to come, 
talking to Karleen, asking her every month if it 
came, if it had come through. I mentioned to Sallie 
that I wanted to get her a wheelchair and they knew 
how Muriel felt about her money and we wanted to—she 
said, well, go check on them and see—we'll talk to 
Muriel along—we decided just to kinda work on Muriel 
a little and, you know— 
Q. (Counsel for Ms. Rackley) Work on her? 
A. Well, we wanted to talk her into a wheelchair. 
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under guardianship or court 
order conservatorship or anything like ths; ^o your 
knowledge, was she** 
III 1 < 
0 Do you--do you agree, ma'am, wibh the proposition 
II ml: it was her money to ilo whatever she wanted w 
"if I ' V,„ 
1
 Arid do you a g r e e t h a t in o r d e r f o r hex t o make a 
d e c i s i o n a b o u t what to do w i t h i t , she had f i r s t of 
a l l , t o know i t was even I Hi re do you a g r e e wi th 
that"? 
A. Yes , 
Tr. /o, . cr~ - o-"7"7 -'emphasis added' . 
F ". HOD LhaL it was reasonable to 
purposefully witnnojo ;ni, riPdLi^n ;"rcm Muriel Metier about her 
c was mentally fragile. -r * Brief at 
3t however, , . c^^ing arguments, counsel izi .la^ i . . •;.-. 
5 ^-P::: f!
 LMuriel Mellen] has not been adjudicated incompe-
tent sn: ^ s no4" * ward ol tne -*tate, \:\- ; . --. ; 
7
 AF Judge Iwasaki cogently observed, with respect to 
;h paternalistic and supposedly well-intentioned actions: 
While . .. ; . paternalist! .: decision on the 
parr of Fairview r. o keep this information away from 
Muriel Mellen, my personal observation is, those are 
the people that you have to watch out the worst for. 
Those who are making decisions :.:i [sic] your behalf, 
without allowing you to make your own decisions, 
those people that are looking out for my best inter-
est are thos= that 1 have to look at the very, very 
hardest 
v, ,_, . ^ \ . _ .- . : : \ddendupi i,! page 15). 
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of that type. Muriel Mellen knows exactly what she's doing." 
Tr. Vol. 5 at 1219 (emphasis added). By Fairview's own de-
scription, Muriel Mellen was capable and had a right to know 
about her own funds. 
Further support for the clear and substantial public 
policy implicated by the facts of this case can be found in the 
Employee Warning Notices given to Karleen Merkley and Sallie 
Maroney (copies attached to Aplt. Brief as Ex. "C" of Adden-
dum) . Both warnings state, "you may not under any circum-
stances deliver funds or articals [sic] belonging to a resident 
to another person without the patients [sic] knowledge." 
Ms. Rackley also presented evidence of the clear and 
substantial public policy implicated in this case through the 
testimony of Ana Lird, the lead ombudsman for Salt Lake County 
Aging Services. Ana Lird testified: 
Q. (Counsel for Ms. Rackley) Okay. Why is it important 
to protect residents1 funds from any kind of abuse? 
A. (Ana Lird) Many of the residents are not able to 
speak for themselves or they don't understand about 
their rights, they don't understand they are—have 
the right to know about her person—their personal 
allowance, their personal accounts, how that works; 
then in general, they have the right that anybody 
else [sic] in the community. 
Q. Okay. Have you seen that written in any documents, 
about the rights that residents have to be aware of 
and to manage their own finances? 
A. Yeah. They are part of the—of the law. 
Q. What—have you—can you tell us where you've seen it 
in the law, particularly? If you know? 
A. That is the—is the part of the O.B.R.A., where the— 
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--and there--designed the residents' 
rights, they reaffirm the residents1 right to man?, 
many of the rights that we have as a citizenship 
[sic]--citizen in the community— 
Q. Is this-
A. --and one of" the rights i s to 
funds. 
Q. To know about their own funds? 
A. And—and be able to hand] e their own funds if this is 
where they (inaudible) 
Q. Is that in a Federal law? 
A. In the Federal law, 
Q. And you have been interpreting and applying this Jaw 
for a long number of years? 
A. Uh huh, yes. 
Q. And you were, as of 1993 and 1994? 
A." Yes, 
r
 a x80-81 (emphasis addec 
The District Court's conch, _ * . _ .* 
termination r'f !^ ? Rackley volated *-e clear -*:> : substantial 
public poji::v ; . *di-. *_ 
review of K^& ^ra' I-P^, constitutional provision-, ^n regula-
tions iir^.:ca:e. ".r parent 
that sub-4 ant: J a] stare ?; : federal concern ror cue. n^r.is of 
persons ~t - ' ^sons; to exercise 
control over their property is abundantly manifest i n the law. 
MfJ 1 loitd I 1 'j, jii'l III HI Hi, | wnrnmont. has laid down law clearly 
and geared toward protecting tne rights o^ •"h? elderly anc : 
no 
the infirm. On a more fundamental level, an individual's 
control over her own property rises to the level of a constitu-
tional right. 
Fairview curiously asserts that the interests of 
society are "not substantial in that nursing home residents 
make up a very small portion of the population." (Aplt. Brief 
at 31) (emphasis added). First, Fairview provides no support 
for this statement (perhaps because there is no such conceiv-
able support — and, certainly, no support in the record of this 
case). Second, whatever the percentage, this analysis is 
inappropriate in deciding what is of significant public con-
cern.8 
Third, the public policy concerns that are implicated 
in this case are clearly evidenced by the testimony of many of 
the witnesses in this case. Joseph Petersen, Sallie Maroney, 
Karleen Merkley, and even Sharon Mellen all agreed that Muriel 
8
 Fairview also claims that since a witness, Ann E. Lee, 
who is employed by the Department of Health did not see any-
thing wrong with Fairview1s conduct, then there is no public 
policy implicated in this case. (Aplt. Brief at 31). Fairview 
mischaracterizes the implications of the testimony. First, 
the witness is not the judge and cannot make legal conclusions. 
Second, the witness only testified regarding her narrow experi-
ence with certain regulations. 
It is strained and erroneous reasoning to conclude that 
because one administrator in a State program concludes that 
Fairviewrs conduct did not violate a certain set of laws and 
regulations, that no public policy concerns are implicated in 
this case. 
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spend it as she saw fit. They also agreea zhaz sne naa no:, 
beer jer.: •• -p.-.= -^ * * --.:.>-=-.,.-- f O I Fairview also acknowl-
edged in losing arguments m a c Muiie 1 Mellon was competent and 
k~ <"-'* ^ ^ • aiie was doi no nnd f -an- -, -Joseph Peters^.. 
acknowledged that it would be against trie ^aw ici rairview to 
fire Ms, Rackley for letting Muriel Mellen know her money had 
arrived. The consensus of ,- wjtnes^-d 
this case provides further support for the District Ccur* 
r i- a. ing en at, .import, am. [L ^.. . . -
Rackley rs termination. 
The Lusi I J ( I « MI i. i ," . i j n i m t ' i l n\ • i l I u < i ' «>''' • l > 
quently: 
But tl le fact remains that Muriel Mellen was not 
incompetent, Muriel Mellen was not designated to be 
someone who needed a guardian, Muriel Mellen was not 
someone who was under a conservatorship, Muriel 
Mellen knew what was happening and she should have 
had the opportunity to know that she had funds there 
and to have some input into her funds. 
While it v ery wel 1 may have been in al 1 good 
faith and honesty, a best decision to make, that 
still begs the issue: Muriel Mellen had the right to 
be told that shea had that money, and the fact that 
Sharon Mellen may have told her at; some later time, 
also begs the issue. 
Tr. Vol. 5 at 1237-38 (emphasis added). 
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The Utah Constitution, Utah and federal statutes and 
regulations, Utah case law, and the testimony of Fairview 
employees all support the District Court's Findings and Conclu-
sions that Ms. Rackley was wrongfully fired in violation of the 
public policy of the State of Utah, and there is no reason for 
this Court to disturb those findings or conclusions in the 
District Court's Judgment. 
D. MS. RACKLEY'S CONDUCT 
Fairview contends that Ms. Rackley!s conduct in 
protecting Muriel Mellen's rights does not constitute conduct 
furthering public policy. Fairview cites Fox v. MCI Communica-
tions Corp,. 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997), in support of this 
contention. Fox involved an employee who reported to manage-
ment that other employees in the company were altering accounts 
on a computer system so that those other employees could 
improve their commissions and sales levels. That conduct did 
not cause harm to customers, and the employer was not harmed in 
that it tolerated the conduct. Id. at 8 61. The plaintiff 
reported the conduct of her co-workers to management, claimed 
that the conduct constituted a violation of computer crime 
laws, and ultimately filed a wrongful termination claim, 
alleging that her termination was in violation of public 
policy. The Utah Supreme Court held that reporting the conduct 
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to her employ-:-; - * - urjlic 
policy. Id. 
This iii^Lci^ . ^ ^ p ^ t e LS ^ ^ . ^^L..readilv distin-
guishable from Fox. >";:<-•, vis , Rackiey die noi leport anything 
i i : t: e r i 1 a ] ] } : , a s Fairview a c k n o w 1 edge d , t h a t t h e 
Fairview start naa purposef u] ly withheld tin- subject ihLonrta-
t j Lne arrival of Muriel Mellen's funds, from. 
Muriel Mellen and ^hat an internal complaini w )M i , i HM I i i , 
t'^ e situation '- -a^kl^v informed Muriel Mellen directly 
tnat the check had arrived. 
Secona, ; :: Fox, there was no individual victim or 
group of , J ct 1ms mpaci - ;. 
coworker** - Ir Ms RackJey's case 'here was a readily i d e m , fi-
at., v- vis,. ^ .- . > \^ 
most drrcct way, ry notifying i ne person venose r.„gnts wete dL 
issue. 
Fairview also cites Winter v. Northwest Pipeline 
L uip. , 8 J HI ii1 H'": - .:?ests that that case 
also suprorts tne proposj f: i or, nia:. o.. ^M*-*a issues to trie 
f; ' - ^ > : ^ r 4 aoes not unr ' "; caf"c public policy. As 
explained, supraf Winter is distingu-^nai^o ir^m Ms. Faeklti y ' s 
,:. . ' "v notified the victim, and not the 
company, of vioiaticnb of public policy. 
In addition, Fairview mischaracterizes the holding in 
Winter. There the plaintiff filed a pro se complaint and 
prosecuted the entire case without the aid of a lawyer. Id. at 
917. The court noted that (1) the law regarding wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy is "in a state of 
development, and at this time, there are no established funda-
mental rules of law in this jurisdiction that support his 
claims" (Id. at 918, n.2), and (2) the court could not become 
an advocate for the plaintiff and without any legal analysis or 
authority, could not address his wrongful termination claim. 
Id. at 919. Had the plaintiff in Winter brought his claim with 
competent counsel, it is not clear that his claim would have 
failed in 1991. In addition, given the developments in Utah 
law since 1991, it is not clear that the plaintiff's case would 
necessarily fail today. 
When Ms. Rackley found out about Muriel Mullen's 
funds and Fairview's decision purposefully to keep from Muriel 
Mellen the fact of the arrival at Fairview of those funds, Ms. 
Rackley went directly to Muriel Mellen and informed her that 
those funds had arrived. 
In this case, there was a clear victim (Ms. Mellen), 
and the violation of her rights inferred in Fairview's denying 
her information regarding the arrival of her funds. Knowledge 
34 
i S p O W t l • - . . - . ;
 : - -: . v . 1 t j l I 1 I I I I 1 ' ' i I I I . 
Rackley was fired for doing so. 
T'"-- T"-f v -• ' \ •. • * -s case is m e 
factual scenario presentee in Hesiop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 
8 - *:-" h^t case, the pxaintiff claimed that he 
was terminated oecduse ne insisted that his employer adhere to 
t Utah r'inanciai Institutions Act (nthu Avl • " ^ah 
Supreme Court held that pui,_i.,.c po--.cy wa^ imoL. -• i:. ; . . ,.- •* 
tne Act r! 'Tot pets *~ ,ne P' -= b "• i f as w^ ; "i -:< ~ * a- i i . a 11* ^" t t e !«s*. , * 
tions themseivc.-. . :.e .-. ' , ' .^re:..:.c .; • - ; - •- . e 
trie relationship between private indivi d ja.,s such as employer 
and employee," 1 d at. o i '", f J" • :»: 1 I lie •'>upieme C o u r t , a n a l y z e J 
whether rne plaintiff was punished for conduct that furthered 
the poi,. .-' > '
 : .,..-._•. . j e 
he c o m p l a i n e d i n t e r n a l l y tc a n u m b e r -.•!" r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s c r • rie 
t J J - . . * " eea nut nave 
cone outside r. n^ :-<-.• K LO r.iy ana correct *'t p o n c y violation " 
Fairview's suggestion that Ms, Rackley's conduct did 
i * 1urther public po1icy because she did r\ot report the pub1ic 
puj. icy violation to "authorities" is thus directly contradii "Led 
bv Hesi op. 
The D i s t r i c t Court" m t l i J j " d ^ t luqufh L i j uiuiii*jl up 
his analysis of Ms. Rackley's conduct in this way: 
If in fact, she was fired for the phone call, if 
in fact, she was fired for the looking out for resi-
dent's rights, I agree with Mr. Petersen, that 
shouldn't be done. That's exactly what happened 
here. She was fired for conduct in attempting to 
solidify and to—and to preserve patient's and resi-
dent's rights. Muriel Mellen had the right to know. 
She wasn't given that right. Ms. Rackley did what 
she could to try and rectify the situation. Because 
of that, she was discharged. Accordingly, all three 
prongs of Heslop has [sic] been met. 
Tr. Vol. 5 at 1239. 
E. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
Fairview is judicially estopped from arguing on 
appeal that Fairview's conduct toward Muriel Mellen did not 
violate the law, and accordingly, that the termination of Ms. 
Rackley was not in violation of public policy. As explained by 
this Court in Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 
791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah App. 1990): 
Generally in legal proceedings a party with knowledge 
of all the facts will not be allowed to take a posi-
tion, pursue that position to fruition, and later, 
with no substantial change in circumstances, return 
to attack the validity of the prior position or the 
outcome flowing from it. See, 28 Am. Jur. 2d 
Estoppel & Waiver §§68-70 (1966). 
The principle of judicial estoppel has also been described by 
this Court in Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co., 
829 P.2d 142, 148, n. 4 (Utah App. 1992), as follows: 
A doctrine which seeks to prevent a party in legal 
36 
proceed!ngs from takii ig a pos itioi i, pursuing that 
position to fruition, and later returning to attack 
the validity of the prior position or the outcome 
flowing from it. Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 4 91, 4 96 
(Utah 1980) ; Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank 
v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct. App, 1990). The 
purposes underlying the doctrine include avoiding 
-•consistency, duplicity and waste of time. Seattle-
_ est Natfl Bank v. Marshall, 31 Wash. App. 339, 641 
P. 2d 1194, 1: " '1982) . 
I *• :i w s 1: I ::> I I j • :i i i :: t: I: e a ] ] o w e d 1: o a :: k i I o A Ji 
edge an interpretation or ••- :=* ;rrouna:ng termmationb 
v • := • ' ~~ " ""> iifreieriL posiLiun 
or. appeal when Lhdi. argument fails. During closing arguments 
in Lnis casef counsel for Fairview acknowledged: 
THE COURT: Do you agree, or is it your position that 
all violations of public policy has [sic] to be a 
violation of law; is that your position? 
COUNSEL FOR FAIRVIEW: Well, that1- co:t of the 
position, 
THE COURT: rtt^, . ..^:-
COUNSEL FOR FAIRVIEW: But-
:; • . THE COURT; --that's like a n c d e pregnant; I mean, 
is — is your position tnat---that; :*. har to be a viola-
tion of law befor€> it's a v;r' r - * * r\;blic policy? 
COUNSEL FOR FAIRVIEW: No„« 
THE COURT: All right 
' COUNSEL FOR FAIRVIEW: It's i lot LI lat i larrow of a 
' reading. 
Tr. Vol.. 5 at 1218 -19 ' (emphasis added). 
Fairview i Iow argues, i n :1 1:s Brief, that 'f [n] othj ng i n 
t:\e language of Ms . Rackley ' s cited legal provisioi is, si iggests, 
clearly r-v" otherwise, that Fal rview w-- r,v. hibited fr;;: han- -
c . ...;.y y\^L , e . ... ei i' s f ui ids i - - " 
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Aplt. Brief at 13. Fairview suggests that if and because 
Fairview did not violate the law, no clear and substantial 
public policy is implicated in this case, Fairview took, 
through counsel, an apparently different position at trial. 
Fairview should be held to be estopped from arguing a contrary 
position on appeal. 
Fairview also at trial took, through counsel, another 
position apparently contrary to that which it now takes with 
regard to Ms. Rackley's duty under Heslop. Counsel stated, 
"part of what Heslop also requires is that actions be pursued 
internally. Internally." Tr. Vol. 5 at 1203. Directly 
contrary to this position is the following assertion in 
Fairview' s Brief, "our Supreme Court has declined to recognize 
public policy claims based upon an employee!s internal com-
plaints." Aplt. Brief at 32. On appeal, Fairview should not 
now (having failed at trial) be allowed to take a contrary 
position. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Ms. Rackley urges the Court, based on the foregoing 
analysis, on the record of this case, and on the law of the 
State of Utah, to uphold Judge Iwasaki's decision, and to 
affirm the Judgment of the District Court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <> day of March, 1998 
PETER C. COLLINS 
TARA L. ISAACSON 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, 1..,. 
Attorneys for Cathleei Rackley 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE , 
I hereby certify that, on the 6 day of March, 
1998, I caused to be served two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE CATHLEEN L. RACKLEY by 
the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Danny Quintana HAND DELIVERY 
QUINTANA & ASSOCIATES £_ U.S. MAIL 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor OVERNIGHT MAIL 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 TELECOPY (FAX) 
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ADDENDUM 
Peter C. Collins (#0700) 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
4021 South 700 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 2 65-1888 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CATHLEEN L. RACKLEY, : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-v- : 
: Case No. 940904822CV 
FAIRVIEW CARE CENTERS, : 
INC., a Utah corporation, : Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Defendant. : 
This case came on for bench trial before the Honor-
able Glenn K. Iwasaki, on October 29 and 3 0 and November 1, 8, 
and 15, 1996. Plaintiff was represented by Peter C. Collins. 
Defendant was represented by Danny Quintana and Lucinda Lomas. 
A follow-up in camera hearing, concerning the question of 
Ms. Rackley,s compensable damages associated with the purchase 
of items related to her pursuing work as a peace officer, was 
held with the Court and Mr. Collins present in chambers and 
with Mr. Quintana participating by telephone, on December 4, 
1996. 
Having considered the evidence (including testimony 
and exhibits), and having also considered the statements, 
representations, and arguments of counsel, and being fully 
Uwj.Uiy v. v..K 
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, the Court 
now makes its following Findings of Fact and enters its 
following Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Cathleen Rackley worked as an employee 
of defendant from November 1, 1993 through February 28, 1994. 
2. Plaintiff was an able, conscientious, and 
diligent employee. 
3. On a number of occasions during that period of 
employment, plaintiff took actions that were disliked by 
members of defendant's management and that were geared toward 
honoring and upholding the law and protecting the rights of 
defendant's employees and the residents of defendant's nursing 
home facility (the west side Salt Lake City facility) of which 
plaintiff served as Administrator during the entirety of her 
employment with defendant. 
4. On February 28, 1994, defendant terminated the 
employment of plaintiff, against her wishes. 
5. Defendant's said termination of plaintiff's 
employment implicated a clear and substantial public policy, to 
wit: the right of the residents of defendant's Salt Lake City 
west side facility (including resident Muriel Mellen) to be 
informed of the fact that resident personal monies had arrived 
at the facility. 
2 
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6. Defendant violated that public policy by, in 
terminating plaintiff's employment, punishing plaintiff for 
engaging in conduct furthering that policy. 
7. Defendant's violation of that public policy was 
a substantial factor (and, according to the evidence, the only 
factor) in defendant's termination of plaintiff's employment. 
8. Plaintiff was being compensated, at the time of 
the termination of her employment, at the rate of $27,000.00 
per year. 
9. Plaintiff did not obtain, despite reasonable and 
diligent efforts in the interim, a new career-related job until 
March 16, 1995, when she obtained employment with the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office. 
10. The principal amount of plaintiff's gross, 
career-related loss of income is, thus, $28,125.00. 
11. In the interim between the termination of her 
employment with defendant and the time she started her job with 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, plaintiff earned 
$5,700.00 working as a school hall monitor; and that amount 
should be deducted from the said $28,125.00 figure. 
12. The net principal amount of plaintiff's loss-of-
income special damages is, thus, $22,425.00. 
13. Plaintiff incurred additional special damages in 
the principal amount of $591.99, representing the reasonable 
costs of the service weapon and accessories plaintiff purchased 
3 003 
as a requirement of her peace officer training and, ultimately, 
her obtaining employment as a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff. 
14. The total principal amount of plaintiff's 
special damages sustained as results of defendant's termination 
of her employment is $23,016.99. 
15. Plaintiff suffered substantial mental and 
emotional distress and suffering, as proximate results of 
defendant's said termination of her employment; and plaintiff's 
general damages, in connection with and by reason of that 
suffering, are in the amount of $3,500.00. 
16. The principal amount of plaintiff's special 
damages, plus the amount of plaintiff's general damages, totals 
$26,516.99. 
17. It was reasonably foreseeable to defendant, and 
it was in fact foreseen by defendant, that plaintiff would be 
required to retain legal counsel to seek compensation for 
defendant's termination of her employment. 
18. Plaintiff in fact was required to obtain legal 
counsel to represent her to seek such compensation. 
19. Plaintiff's attorney's fee is contractually set 
at 4 0% of all sums recovered from defendant in this action, and 
that is a reasonable fee in the circumstances of this case. 
20. In addition to her special and general damages 
fixed hereinabove, plaintiff is entitled to recover, from 
defendant, the following sums: 
4 
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a. interest (pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
27-44 and 15-1-1) at the legal rate of 10% per annum, from 
February 28, 1994 to the date Judgment is entered herein; and 
b. her costs of court, pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in an amount to be fixed 
by the Court. 
21. Accordingly, the amount of the Judgment to be 
entered herein shall be: 
a. $26,516.99 (compensatory damages (special 
damages plus general damages)); plus 
b. interest on special damages ($6,430.38 as 
of December 15, 1996 plus $6.40 per diem thereafter until 
Judgment is entered); plus 
c. 40% of the sum of items (a) and (b) 
($13,180.15 as of December 15, 1996, plus $2.56 per diem 
thereafter until Judgment is entered). 
22. The amount of that Judgment shall be augmented 
by the following: 
a. plaintiff's compensable costs of court (to 
be determined by the Court); plus 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant unlawfully terminated the employment 
of plaintiff in violation of the public policy of the State of 
5
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Utah, including but not limited to the clear and substantial 
public policy considerations set forth in the following: 
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 27 of the Utah Constitution 
42 U.S.C. §§ 3058g(a)(3) and (5) 
Utah Code Ann, §§ 62A-3-201, et seq. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396(i)(6) 
Utah Admin. Code § R432-150-4 
42 C.F.R. § 483.10 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment against 
defendant for her special damages, her general damages, 
interest on special damages from February 28, 1994 to the date 
Judgment is entered, and her costs of Court; 
3. Judgment shall be entered in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendant, in the amount indicated by paragraph 21 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact; 
4. The amount of the Judgment shall be augmented by 
the amounts indicated in paragraph 22 of the foregoing Findings 
of Fact; and 
5. The entire amount of the Judgment (including 
that augmentation) shall bear interest at the Judgment interest 
rate as of the date Judgment is entered. 
DATED this ^ ' day of ,/V?9^' , 1996. 
GLENN K. IWASAKI 
District Judge 
OGS X ' V 
* * '•• 5 S .'* 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
cd-
I hereby certify that, on the day of December, 
199 6, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by 
the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Danny Quintana 
Lucinda Lomas 
Judge Building, Suite 73 5 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RACKLEY\TRL-FFCL.2 
HAND DELIVERY 
U.S. MAIL 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 
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of things that they do in that place in the course of their 
corporate life that aren't against the law, just like if 
you—but—but if they do something that violates a public 
policy and that public policy are implicated as they are 
clearly in this case, then it is a violation of law and 
there is liability. 
The fact that somebody doesn't break a—a Fish & 
Game law when he goes out and kills somebody doesn't mean 
that he hasn't done something wrong, and vice versa. 
There's any number of things we can talk about. If they did 
some things that weren't in violation of the law, that 
doesn't somehow elevate their conduct in other realms to 
legality. 
We're—we're satisfied, your Honor. I've talked 
enough. Unless you have any questions, at this point, I'd 
submit it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Collins. 
The Court has had ample opportunity to hear the 
evidence, more than ample to mull over the issues and to, at 
this time, to be prepared to render a decision. Before I do 
that, however, or part of my decision, I want to make some 
observations. 
I do not buy the proposition that plaintiff, 
Cathleen Rackley, in this matter is a money-grubbing 
plaintiff who hired on to this job with the sole purpose of 
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driving this nursing home to its demise economically and to 
attempt to gain whatever advantage that she may have by 
virtue of a four-month employment with the defendant. 
I do not accept the proposition that her only 
interest in this matter was financial and for her own 
benefit and disregarding all of the other aspects of—of her| 
testimony. 
I do find her to be conscientious, to be honest, 
hard-working and committed, at least during the time that 
she was employed in nursing homes or other facilities, 
committed to rights of both employees and—and residents. 
On the other hand, I don't buy the proposition 
that Fairview Nursing Home was a pig sty. I don't—I don't 
accept the proposition that it was in—it was in a horribly 
terribly—terrible position prior to plaintiff's hiring on 
and only because of plaintiff's herculean efforts did any 
changes come about. 
It appears to me that based upon the surveys that 
have been admitted here, that the Fairview facility was a 
well-run facility, and that—that's a relative term, because 
it's a well-run facility as to nursing homes. And having 
the minimum wage employees, the high turn-over, they do what| 
they can do and they do it as best they can. Sure, this is 
not the Taj Majal of nursing homes; on the other hand, it is 
not the pig sty which it has been represented to be. 
1232 ,->
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Regardless of which, those are observations that I 
want everyone to hear before I get into the meats of this 
case, the meat of this case. 
Pursuant to Heslop, I must find—well, even prior 
to getting into any holdings of any cases, the issue before 
the Court is whether there was a firing, whether there was a 
constructive firing or whether there was a—an affirmative 
act to quit by the plaintiff. 
The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
and the totality of the circumstance, including the 
testimony of those concerned who were at that meeting in 
late February, that the defendant was fired—I mean that the 
plaintiff was fired. 
Only upon her response to the firing, was there a 
re-offer of the—of the job, and that was never accepted. 
It can't be a unilateral re-offering or re-hiring, it has to 
be an acceptance. Once someone's fired, there must then be 
an offer and an acceptance. That wasn't done. It's a 
firing. I don't even have to get into constructive firing. 
That was a firing. 
Once that's determined, and now looking at Heslop, 
the Court must determine whether or not the three-prong test 
of Heslop has been met in this. Number one, was the 
employee—employee's termination implicate a clear and 
substantial public policy? Yes, it did. The public policy, 
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The specific public policy, which I agree with 
upon questioning of Mr. Collins, is the right of residents 
to know what their property is, whether it's financial or 
otherwise, to have a determination, a say in what happens to| 
that property. That's the public policy and that has been 
invoked in this matter. 
Second, the employer must require the employee to 
violate that policy or punish them for conducting—for 
conduct furthering it. 
Let me move on to the third one. Violation of the' 
public policy must be a substantial factor in the 
plaintiff's termination. 
Let me discuss that third prong first. I don't 
know how many times during this trial, I mentioned and I 
allowed, testimony of plaintiff's action, over objection as 
to what she was doing on the job, and I don't know how many 
times I mentioned specifically Heslop in saying that. 
I must weigh, if I find there's a firing, I must 
weigh whether or not the violation of the public policy was 
a substantial factor in the plaintiff's termination. Once 
doing that over objection, it appeared to me obvious that 
there must be some evidence that if this was a firing, what 
factors were considered regarding the firing. 
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The defense, on the other hand, took and 
maintained the sole defense in that she wasn't fired, she 
quit, and did not present any nexus to this Court, from the 
person who has the obligation of hiring and firing, Mr. 
Petersen, as to whether or not, if he didn't—if she didn't 
quit, what factors were present that would substantiate a 
firing. 
This is an at-will employment. There needn't be 
any grounds at all given for any firing, but once it's in 
the firing and a violation of public policy, I must weigh 
whether or not that firing was a substantial factor in the 
plaintiff's termination. There wasn't any evidence to the 
contrary. 
The defendants chose to put all their eggs in one 
basket. The defendants chose to say this—this person quit 
and there is no—nothing to weigh. Once that fails, there's 
nothing before the Court. 
It could have very easily been, in the same way 
that Mr. Collins had alternative theories as to his 
recovery, a question to Mr. Petersen. Mr. Petersen, I 
understand your position that she quit; however, pursuant to 
Heslop, the Court must consider the substantial factoring 
and weighing of these factors. What factors would have led 
you to fire her if you would have fired her? There was no 
evidence, absolutely none. 
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There was evidence from a lot of other people that 
indicated she had missed a Christmas party, that she was 
late, that she wasn't there, that she had a bad attitude, 
that she didn't communicate with people; but not one word 
from Mr. Petersen indicating that those were factors that he 
would have considered in firing her. How can I weigh, how 
can I determine whether there's a substantial factor in the 
violation of public policy against other reasons for firing, 
if there was no other reason submitted to the Court? 
So, even if I do consider that, which has not been] 
presented to me in any competent form, but even if I do 
consider that, I have to then really read between the lines, 
because the—the ostensible reasons for firing, all of which] 
were not presented by Mr. Petersen, but were mentioned in 
the January meeting, had all been taken care of. In Mr. 
Petersen's own testimony and handwriting. 
He had indicated on that exhibit, and I don't know] 
which one specifically, taken care of, not an issue; so what] 
does that leave? It leaves then, ostensibly, the telephone 
call to Sharon Mellen at work. 
Well, what is that related to? The reason for thej 
telephone call to Sharon Mellen at work was the concern the 
plaintiff had for the possible violation of Muriel Mellen's 
right to know that she had that money, that she had the 
$720. 
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I don't criticize Sharon Mellen. Sharon Mellen is 
not a thief. Sharon Mellen did not steal this money from 
Muriel Mellen. 
I don't criticize the facility for working with 
Sharon Mellen to, I guess, protect Muriel Mellen from her 
own best desires and interest of having the money because of 
all of the other problems that were attendant with Muriel 
Mellen. 
But the fact remains that Muriel Mellen was not 
incompetent, Muriel Mellen was not designated to be someone 
who needed a guardian, Muriel Mellen was not someone who was 
under a conservatorship, Muriel Mellen knew what was 
happening and she should have had the opportunity to know 
that she had funds there and to have some input into her 
funds. 
Sharon Mellen is a wonderful daughter-in-law, as 
far as I'm concerned, if she's going to support this woman 
during the time that she didn't get her checks. Once again, 
I'm not critical of Sharon Mellen at all. 
On the other hand, the plaintiff very well may 
have jumped the gun, maybe should have talked to other 
people who were more conversant with the Mellen file, maybe 
should not have even called Ms. Mellen at work; but that's 
not the issues here. The issues are that Muriel Mellen had 
the right to know and—and the testimony that the Court is 
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convinced occurred was that there was a—not a conspiracy, 
because that has bad connotations—was an agreement that 
people not tell Ms. Mellen—Muriel Mellen that she has 
money, because once she has that knowledge, then she wants 
to leave the facility, she wants to do all these foolish 
things, but that's her decision-to make. 
While it was a paternalistic decision on the part 
of Fairview to keep this information away from Muriel 
Mellen, my personal observations is, those are the people 
that you have to watch out the worst for. Those who are 
making decisions in your behalf, without allowing you to 
make your own decisions, those people that are looking out 
for my best interest are those that I have to look at the 
very, very hardest. 
While it very well may have been in all good faith 
and honesty, a best decision to make, that still begs the 
issue: Muriel Mellen had the right to be told that she had 
that money, and the fact that Sharon Mellen may have told 
her at some later time, also begs the issue. 
There was an agreement among those people at the 
facility, that Muriel Mellen would not be told that she had 
that money, and it's not the facility's right or the 
decision of the facility to come to that conclusion. 
So, once talking about the violation of public 
policy, I must now go back to see whether or not the 
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employer required the employee to violate that policy or 
punished them for conducting—for conduct furthering it. 
No, there was no evidence and there's no 
implication at all that the—Fairview fired the plaintiff 
due to the fact that they insisted that she continue to 
violate the policy, that's not so, and she refused. That's 
not it. 
But to punish the plaintiff for conduct furthering 
it. When I asked Mr.—when I asked—one of the questions 
that the Court had was whether or not even though they—the 
defendants complied with all of the changes, even though the 
defendants, once brought to their attention that they were 
lacking in paid—pay days or the Hepatitis B, they changed 
it, still doesn't mean that someone could not be fired for 
conduct furthering public policy. 
If in fact she was fired for the phone call, if in 
fact, she was fired for the looking out for resident's 
rights, I agree with Mr. Petersen, that shouldn't be done. 
That's exactly what happened here. She was fired for 
conduct in attempting to solidify and to—and to preserve 
patient's and resident's rights. Muriel Mellen had the 
right to know. She wasn't given that right. Ms. Rackley 
did what she could to try to rectify the situation. Becausej 
of that, she was discharged. Accordingly, all three prongs 
of Heslop has been met. 
1239 
16 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1b 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
2b 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Now, we go to the issue of damages. Once I've 
indicated that, then obviously, counterclaim is not cause, 
because this is a meritorious action and there's no relief 
on defendant's counterclaim. 
The damages, and—and you correctly indicated it, 
Mr. Collins, that at 27,000 is what I have to begin with, 
and it's 27,000 a year plus the two weeks, so I think you'll 
have to make some fractional determination as to that; but 
that will be the starting point. 
While I may or may not have agreed with you 
regarding the unemployment, it is clear that there was no— 
no amount stated that I could even offset. Even if I agreed 
that unemployment should have been reduced from that 27,000-
plus, there was no amount that was shown. 
And while Mr. Quintana very well may have asked 
the defendant, how much did you receive, it never came in a 
dollars and cents number, and so that's not before me and I 
can't deduct it; however, for the job as hall monitor, 
regardless of your position, Mr. Collins, I find that that 
should be deducted, 5,700 or thereabouts, I don't know what 
the exact figure was, you find it out, that's going to be 
deducted from the 2,700—27,000. 
MR. COLLINS: Whatever the evidence was 
on that, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
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MR. COLLINS: There was evidence on 
that, whatever the evidence was is what I deduct? 
THE COURT: It was—it was—it was, I 
believe it was her testimony— 
MR. COLLINS: Yes, it was. 
THE COURT: —how much she made. 
MR. COLLINS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that's the only thing 
competent. 
MR. COLLINS: Yes. 
THE COURT: There was no pay stubs that 
was—I mean, it could have been $30,000 for whatever I know, 
but there was no pay stubs that were subpoenaed, and the 
only thing I have is her testimony, so that's—that's what 
it will be. 
Let's get into the area of general damages. That-
-and that's a hard situation, because on one hand, Ms. 
Rackley is wrong, she's persistent and she does make an 
effort to get on—get on with her life, as evidenced by her 
statements, regarding once she had received the notification 
that her complaints had not drawn fruit, then she says, 
okay, that's that and I'm getting on with things. 
That, to me, indicates that the pain and suffering 
that she did incur was not of a substantial nature and 
furthermore, that while she did attempt to find employment 
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in her chosen area, that of nursing home administration, 
once another opportunity come along, presented itself, she 
read—she chose that alternative route into law enforcement 
rather than to pursue her—her main—her main desires in 
nursing home administration. 
I do not minimize the amount of pain and suffering] 
that she may have incurred directly after the firing and 
I've termed it a firing. I do not find that it reaches any 
proportion close to what has been suggested. Accordingly, 
minimal general damages of $3,500 will be awarded. 
With that, I also find that attorney's fees are 
reasonably foreseeable in this matter pursuant to the 
language of Heslop, 40 percent contingency, so what will be 
done is, arithmetic; you take the 27,000-plus, minus the 
5,700, add back the 3,500, take 40 percent of that, that's 
going to be the attorney's fees and that will be the amount 
of the judgment in this matter. 
I further, in support of my findings, I further 
turn to the—to the December 5th, 1994, report of Anna Lird, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, in which she had indicated: 
Conclusion, complaints semi-verified. The resident had 
signed a form where she gives authority to the facility to 
open her mail. The resident is alert and able to make 
decisions about her financial affairs. The resident consent| 
that the family member handle her financial—the resident 
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consent, and that should be consented, that the family 
member handle her financial affairs. 
And that was all done and there's nothing wrong 
with that; however, and I agree with Ms. Lird on this, this 
writing agreement should not be understood as if the 
resident had declined to her rights of being informed about 
her financial status. I find that she did not decline that 
right and that right was what was being pursued by Ms. 
Rackley and that's what caused everything in this—in this 
lawsuit. 
Draft up the order on this, Mr. Collins and the 
judgment. 
It—it is unfortunate that—well, it's not 
unfortunate. The Court must rule on what is before me. If 
this case were tried ten different ways, I would have ten 
different ways of how to rule on this case; but the status 
of the evidence that is before me is, as I believe 
accurately stated by myself. I—I didn't have any other 
choice but to rule this way, and accordingly, the Court will 
enter judgment as indicated from the bench. 
Mr. Collins, please be so kind to draft up the 
appropriate pleadings and submit it. 
MR. COLLINS: Yes. Thank you, your 
Honor. Appreciate it. 
THE COURT: We're in recess. 
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